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S T A T E M E N T

I.

OF

F A C T S

Identification of Parties,

An understanding of the

facts of this case requires an identification of the parties from
two separate families•

The families have become intertwined

because divorce and remarriage in each resulted in an unplanned
exchange of marital partners.
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Bobbie

C.

Dickinson

(hereafter

Bobbie) was married to Defendant-Respondent, Sherril Cottrell
Dickinson (hereafter Sherril).

During the course of the marriage

Bobbie

relationship

developed

a

romantic

with

Gloria

(hereafter Gloria), then the wife of Wally Henrie

Henrie

(hereafter

Wally). [TR23, 62-65, 97-99]
The Henrie marriage ended in divorce (Henrie divorce)
as did the Dickinson marriage, the decree in the latter having
been entered on or about November 25, 1985 (Dickinson divorce).
We

are

herein

concerned

with

the

Dickinson

divorce.

The

Dickinson decree was made final upon entry and some six weeks
later,

on

January

[T13,10SEPT.86]

11,

1986,

Bobbie

married

Gloria

Henrie.

Three months after that, on April 11, 1986,

Wally Henrie married Sherril, thereby completing the unplanned
exchange.

[T38,10SEPT.86]

There are three Dickinson children,

two of whom reside with their mother, Sherril, and one with his
father, Bobbie.

Bobbie was ordered to pay $150 per child for the

two children residing with their mother in the Henrie household.

3
= TR123]

There are

four Honrie children, "'"- ••-•
i.

- i ; -'/ w a s

Waliy.
three

ch'ldr*^.

ol

questioned

i.-: : one who resides w^th h ^

i-:i^-ir

A

\

:

u

'

-

-

The Trial and Original Decree ,

piopeity

some

j rocisel

;•-•'

: t h*-

,,;,_>;,., 36 ]

11 •

division

*

ordorr-d to pry yl^S [>e- north for r ... :

r^sidirv-;

housen:j .; .

'

i

as

personal

well

is

property

lolil in 11 ill ii |HK ed,

debt

Bothi o f -: i .-d +"o -

assumption.

items 1 ut
[lkl}b]

ill

were

Sherril
iwarded

t< anther, tin

dobt

assumption adopted by tho court was in conformity with Robbie's
proposal

I ith respect 1o tho c;orond mortgage on t ho f iin i I

1I in uhi

I

J « * < i\

I

J

lojjot, Bobbie ie^ titled:

Q.
N vt one other item, m w under a listing
of your expenses on item four I believe in
accordance with an agreement that you and
your wife had you had agreed to accept the
second mortgage? is that right?
A.

I u ii 1) assume it.

().

Ajid that is lour hundi c d I II n

isn't

announced

M

n nil ,

is that correct?

I

I h it i ; oorrrot , | TF41 ]

*I

MM

I *jgi nil niq

oi

tho

trial,

Bobbie's

counsel

tho rosult which Bobbie dosiied and which, with only

one exception was follow* 1
ilibi ' < nun rL s1 tlod,
The division that ho has recommended is to
give the Defendant the benefit of about two
to one.
He has also ro< oramended that the
ownership of the home stay in both of th^ra
and if the home is ever abandoned by the
Defendant, either by reason of marriage or by
reason ol a permanent move or just that she

4
elects to sell that then the equity in the
home which remains be divided equally. [TR6]
The court declined to accept Bobbie's recommendation
regarding the equity in the home and awarded the same to Sherril.
The evidence revealed that the second mortgage on the
family home had resulted from a consolidation of miscellaneous
debts.

[TR31;T36,10SEPT.86]

Consistent with the agreement of

the parties, Bobbie was ordered to pay this debt and Sherril was
ordered to pay the first mortgage on the family home.

[TR124]

The division proposed by Bobbie did not cover a supply
of fire wood which Bobbie had taken to Gloria Henrie's home and
his mothers home.

[TR104-105]

The court ordered Bobbie to

deliver one-half of this wood to Sherril.
Sherril did

[TR126].

not want the divorce

and

encouraged a

reconciliation after Bobbie's initial interest in Gloria.
98]
[Id.]

[TR97-

The parties received counseling and sought to reconcile.
While Sherril was in the hospital and recuperating from

surgery at her parent's home, Bobbie's interest in Gloria was
rekindled and when Sherril returned home Bobbie advised that he
was moving out.

[Id.]

Sherril was not well equipped to meet the financial
demands of life alone.

Her earning power was $2,100 a year,

whereas Bobbie had an annual earning power of $25,000.

[TR124]

Sherril had worked and taken care of the home while Bobbie had
obtained

a college degree at Utah State University.

67,103-104]

[TR65-

5
At the time of trial Sherril had no source of income
other

than

[TR102]

a

part-time

job which

produced

$17 5 per month.

After Bobbie left, she enrolled at the Sevier Valley

Tech with plans to continue her eduction to become a teacher.
[Id.]

She testified she could not do this without Bobbie's

assistance.

[TR103]

no duty of assistance.

Bobbie was unwilling and felt he owed her
He testified:

Q. Do you know that she is going to school
right now?
A.

Yes.

Q. Do you think that she is entitled to some
assistance in getting her degree?
A. If she had contributed to books, school,
and tuition, and those I would say yes, but
she did not contribute to my books, schooling, and eduction.
Q. So your theory is that because she paid
rent and groceries that it doesn't count?
A.
It does count but I paid rent and
groceries too plus everything else and so far
as her obtaining her teacher's certificate
there are many financial aids that does not
have to be a pay-back until she obtains that
certificate through the universities. There
are government grants, loans and through my
loan if I had obtained a teacher's certificate instead of a degree in forest management
I would have had to pay it back.
I could
have borrowed any amount I wanted for
tuition, rent, room and board and she can do
exactly the same thing now.
Q. The bottom line is you <3on't think you
should help her at all.
A.

No, I don't.

Q.
Do you figure you should give her any
alimony?

6
A.

Nof I don't.

Q. It would be your position that you should
just cut her free and do whatever?
A.
That is not my position.
I will take
care of my children but if she wants to make
a living she thinks she needs she can get out
and work because I don't owe her anything.
Q.
You propose to give her a hundred and
twenty-five dollars a month per child which
would be . . . two hundred and fifty [for two
children] . . .
A. With the insurance premiums included in
that. That would put it up to a hundred and
sixty. [TR67-68]
The court disagreed and awarded Sherril $3 00 per month
alimony for a period of twenty-four (24) months [TR125] and $150
per month for each of the children together with insurance.
[TR123-124]

Sherril's counsel pressed for additional help for

tuition and school expenses, but the court indicated that all of
this had been taken into consideration in arriving at the overall
award.

[TR127-128]

The award of the home equity was part of

that award.
The Appellant's brief creates serious misimpressions as
to the nature of the court's approach to the property division.
There were no findings regarding values as implied on page four
and five of Appellant's brief.
issue.

Such values were simply not at

Bobbie had introduced exhibits containing his opinion as

to value, but since he also proposed a division fully embraced by
the court and resisted only as to a couple of minor items by
Sherril,

the matter

of values

prevailed on the contested items.

was

not dealt with.

[TR125]

Bobbie

7
In addition to the serious disparity in earning power
the evidence also revealed that Bobbie had a reasonable expectation of an enhanced business opportunity•

His employer, Craig

Anderson of Anderson Floral, testified as follows:
Q.
Mr. Dickinson has been with you twenty
years or so?
A.

Approximately.

Q.

He is a good employee?

A. Yes.
ways.

We have a good relationship both

Q. And there has been actually some discussion about him working into th« ownership of
the business?
A. I would hope that within the next three
years we could work something out, yes.
Q.
And he would enjoy & preferential
position over most anyone else you can think
of?
A.

Yes, definitely. [TR88]

Further, Bobbie had certain bonus money in hand at the
time of the trial and had an expectation of more when a job then
in process was completed.

Specifically, the parties had tenta-

tively agreed that Sherril would receive an additional $1,400,
which Bobbie declined to give her opting to wait and see if the
court required the same.

[TR108]

The job then in process was at

the Red Hills Middle School in Richfield on which he was to
receive 3 0 percent of the profit.

[TR58]

No fixed dollar amount

was determined, but Bobbie was awarded the same along with the
bonus money then in his possession, notwithstanding the protestations of Sherrilfs counsel.

[TR127-128]

8
Both

parties

were

sufficiently

satisfied

with

the

Divorce Decree that neither took an appeal,
III.

The First Modification Hearing.

The parties were

back before the court on Bobbie's Petition for Modification, less
than one year later, on September 10, 1986.

By this time both

had remarried and Bobbie sought to be freed from satisfaction of
the second mortgage which he had previously agreed to assume.
Bobbie's claim at this hearing was little different than the
claim which he pressed the following May.

Bobbie relied on the

fact that Sherril had moved from the family home and had leased
the same for a rental income of $260 per month. [T21,43,10SEPT.86]
The evidence showed that after Sherril paid the first mortgage
payment to the Farm Home Administration, the taxes, insurance and
upkeep, her cash flow on the home was $10.

[T43,10SEPT.86]1

Bobbie further claimed a significant reduction in his
income.
gross

His exhibit one [admitted at T2 0,10SEPT.87] reflected a
income

for

the

first

$12,577.39.

While

the

computations,

this

would

$20,123.82.

seven

record

and

does

equate

to

one-half

not
an

months

of

reflect

arithmetic

annual

income

of

Bobbie further claimed an increase in Sherril's

income, which for the first seven and one-half months had been
$1,388, [T40,10SEPT.86] exclusive of $15 per month from teaching
piano

lessons.
1

[T41,10SEPT.86]

Simple

arithmetic

places

While it did not surface at this hearing, the evidence
before the Court on May 27, 1987, revealed that when Sherril
moved out of the family home she became ineligible for continued
financing through the Farm Home Administration and will be
obliged to pay off the first mortgage within two years. [T34,27MAY87]

9
Sherrilfs annual income at the time of this hearing at $2,400.80•
These

income

figures

of

figures

were

contrasted

$25,000

and

$2,100

to the divorce

for

Bobbie

and

decree
Sherril

respectively.
Since

Sherril

had

remarried

the

preceding

April,

Bobbie, on the advise of counsel, had discontinued the $3 00 per
month alimony payment. [T25,10SEPT.86]
his

Further, as a result of

remarriage, there was now an exchange of child

support

payments between the Dickinson and Henrie households.

Bobbie

acknowledged that he paid $3 00 per month to the Henrie household
for his two minor children, but received $500 [$495] from the
Henrie household for the three minor children of his current
wife, Gloria.

[T30;T47,10SEPT.86]

At the conclusion of the evidence at the September 10,
hearing, the court ruled that there had not been a material
change of circumstances and ordered Bobbie to continue to make
the mortgage payments as per the terms of the original decree.
[T51-52,10SEPT.86]
No appeal was taken from this decision.
IV.

The Contempt Proceedings.

Bobbie discontinued

making the second mortgage payments at or about the time of the
modification hearing

in September

of 1986.

He had made no

further payments when the parties were before the court for
contempt proceedings on the 13th day of May, 1987.

[T6,13MAY87]

Between the hearing of September 10, 1986, and the contempt
hearing of May 13, 1987, the second mortgage was renegotiated

resulting in a reduction of the monthly payment from $400 to
$218.

[T26,27MAY87]

These negotiations had begun between Bobbie

and his counsel and the bank, but when they failed Sherril and
her current husband, Wally, agreed to the refinancing rather than
to lose the home.

[T17-25,13MAY87]

The bank official, Brad W.

Thompson, testified that the bank had been willing to agree to
almost every concession requested by Bobbie and his counsel.
[T19-21, 25-26,13MAY87]

There was some dispute as to what offer

the bank had extended to Bobbie, but the latter testified that he
had been willing to pay $240 per month.

[T60,13MAY87]

Upon

hearing this, the court sought to short-circuit the dispute and
resolve the matter.
THE COURT: Mr. Taylor, it seems to me that
they've now done it, haven't they?
[the
monthly payment was now $218]
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. But we're looking at the
contempt, Your Honor . . .
THE COURT:
It seems to me like we're
spending a lot of time getting nowhere.
That's the way it appears to me. They say
they want you to assume it and you say that's
what they want, and you say, "Well that's
what we tried to get." To me, I just don't
understand why we're spending time arguing
about something that you claimed that's what
you were trying to do.
MR. TAYLOR: We want to show that we made a
good faith effort to work out a deal with the
bank. [T61,13MAY87]
Bobbie was now unwilling to accept more preferential
terms than he had previously sought, and insisted on proceeding
with

another

Petition

for

Modification

seeking

to

be

fully

11
relieved from payment of the second mortgage. 2
In

addition

to

his

failure

to

make

the

mortgage

payments, Bobbie failed or refused to sign a Quit Claim Deed on
the family home which had been required by the bank and Sherril
had incurred legal costs in obtaining an amendment to the decree
in lieu of the requested deed.
hearing

Bobbie

[T62,13MAY87]
for

the

finally

[T30-31,13MAY87]

agreed

to

sign

the

At the contempt

Quit

Claim

Deed.

Further, Bobbie had undertaken to buy some things

minor

children

and

deducted

support payments due Sherril.

the

costs

thereof

from

This was remedied shortly before

the contempt hearing, but not until after Sherril had expended
considerable costs.

[T28-29,13MAY87]

At the conclusion of the contempt hearing the court
ordered Bobbie to assume and pay the renegotiated debt at the
bank

and

further

awarded

Sherril

judgment

for

the

interim

payments she had been obliged to pay the bank along with $500
attorney's

fees.

[T83,13MAY87]

The

court

held

Bobbie

in

contempt, sentenced him to 15 days in jail, but stayed execution
so long as he was current in his payments at the bank for the
succeeding year.
V.

[T83,13MAY87]

The Second Petition for Modification.

The second

Petition for Modification came before the court on May 27, 1987.
2

The second petition for modification had been filed the
morning of the contempt hearing (May 13, 1987).
[T14,13MAY87]
Sherril's counsel offered to respond to the petition in the same
hearing without additional delay.
[Id.]
Bobbie's counsel
declined
[Id.] and at the conclusion of the proceedings it was
stipulated that the matter would go forward two weeks later on
May 27, 1987. [T84,13MAY87]

12
Counsel

stipulated

that

the

court

could

consider

all

of

the

evidence which had been introduced at the contempt hearing two
weeks

earlier.

[T4,27MAY87]

Bobbie's

justification

at

the

second modification hearing was essentially the same as had been
presented

at

additional

the

factor

hearing
not

on

the

present

first

and

petition.

argued

to

The

the

court

only
the

preceding September was the majority of the oldest Henrie child,
Michael.

At

the

time

of

the

May

27,

hearing

Michael

had

graduated from High School and was planning to attend college in
the fall.

While his father, Wally, had made the final support

payment for Michael the month before, he testified that he was
prepared
mission.

to

support him

[T14,27MAY87]

in college

that

fall and

later on a

The boy's mother, Gloria, now Bobbie's

wife, also testified that she and the boy's father, Wally, could
provide the necessary help
mission field.

for the boy

[T41,27MAY87]

in college and in the

The boy's father gave a revealing

response:
Q.
What's the biggest obstacle in your
having the means to help him on his mission?
A.
Well, having to assume Mr. Dickinson's
debt.
[T71,13MAY87]
Sherril likewise agreed that her husband, Wally, should support
his own son in the mission field.

[T37,13MAY87]

At the time the divorce was granted Bobbie was obligated to pay $1,000 per month consisting of $300 child support,
$300 alimony, and $4 00 on the second mortgage.

At the time of

the second modification hearing on May 27, 1987, this had been

13
cut almost in half.

Bobbie acknowledged that he no longer paid

alimony, that the second mortgage payment was only $218, and that
he was paying $482 less at that time than at the time the decree
was originally enteredBobbie remained

obligated,

Henrie household.
even

after

[T25-26, 27MAY87]

$300 was child support paid to the

Bobbie's household

the majority

Of the $518 for which

received

$330

of the child Michael.

in return

Bobbie's net

monthly outflow was thereby reduced to $188.
Because the May 13, hearing related to contempt, the
court received broad income evidence on both of the Henries and
both of the Dickinsons.

The Henries had a combined 1986 gross

income of $31,166.29 consisting of Wally's income of $28,438.29
and Sherril's income of $2,728.
adjusted
indicated

gross

income was

[T13,27MAY87]

$28,848.

Henrie's combined

[1T33,13MAY87]

this was the more fair figure.

The court

[T42,13MAY87]

The

combined Dickinson income, using Bobbie's figures, and assuming
no unreported cash payments, was $29,333.92, $12,000 produced by
Gloria

[T53,27MAY87]

[T56,27MAY87]

The

and

$17,333.92

legitimacy

of

produced

Bobbie's

by

figures

Bobbie.

were

com-

promised by Bobbie's own testimony, that he and his wife had a
net disposable income in 1986 of $34,539.
Bobbie
$37,440 during

claimed
1986

that

he

and

[T49,13MAY87]
Gloria

actually

spent

[T50,27MAY87] and this was so even though

both their motor vehicles were paid for and they paid no mortgage
debt except for the portion of the year they paid on the second
mortgage in question.

[T49-51,13MAY87]

In contrast, during 1986
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the Henries lived on a net income from Wally of $795 every two
weeks, [T46,13MAY87] and a net income from Sherril of $175 per
month

[T33,27MAY86;T45,10SEPT.86]

$22,770, plus the

$3,600 child

for

an

support

making a grand total of $26,370.

annual

received

amount

from Bobbie

Testimony indicated a more

frugal life style in the Henrie household. [T37-39,13MAY87]
difference

between

the

of

Dickinson's

net disposable

The

income of

$34,539 and their actual expenditures of $37,440 was funded with
a credit card.

[T54-55,13MAY87]

S U M M A R Y

OF

A R G U M E N T

This appeal is an impermissible collateral attack on a
property settlement contained in a divorce decree from which no
appeal was taken.

Appellantfs attempt to challenge the equity of

the original decree should not be tolerated.
Appellant
evidence

has

twice

presented

in support of petitions

essentially

the same

for modification.

In both

instances the lower court has found an inadequate change of
circumstances

to

warrant

upsetting

the

property

settlement.

Appellant failed to appeal from the first denial and, accordingly, the second petition may also be fairly termed a collateral
attack.
The

findings

of

the

lower

court

are

not

"clearly

erroneous" and Appellant has failed in his burden of establishing
substantial prejudicial error or serous inequity manifesting a
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clear abuse of discretion.
Appellant's contemptuous unwillingness to abide by the
decree and orders of the lower court, and his effort to undermine
the same by collateral

attacks, rather than timely appeals,

warrants an award of costs and attorney's fees to Respondent
under Rule 33(a) of this court.

A R G U M E N T

POINT I; IT IS IMPROPER TO CHALLENGE THE EQUITY OF THE
ORIGINAL DECREE THROUGH A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR MODIFICATION,
Appellant's brief clearly reflects a dissatisfaction
with the provisions of the original divorce decree.

Appellant

goes behind the decree in an examination of values never really
considered by the district court.

The examination is a blatant

effort to demonstrate that the decree was unfair.

The law is

clear that a divorce decree is res judicata as to circumstances
existing at the time of the decree.
692, (Utah 1977).]

[McLane vs. McLanef 750 P.2d

It is impermissible to collaterally attack a

decree through a subsequent modification proceeding. rKessimakis
vs. Kessimakis, 580 P. 2d 1090 (Utah 1978).]

In Kessimakis the

court stated • . .
[Appellant's] attempt to challenge the equity
of the original decree cannot be tolerated.
[1091].
In

a

concurring

opinion

in the

recent case of Kinsman vs.

Kinsmanf 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988), Justice Jackson discusses
the concept of res judicata as it relates to divorce decrees.
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The doctrine cannot be given the carte blanche effect it is given
in most civil litigation because of the continuing jurisdiction
in divorce actions provided by statue (UCA 30-3-5).

Nonetheless,

as Judge Jackson notes, "
The decree is res judicata as to circumstances existing at the time of the decree,
[Kinsman, at 215, quoting from McLane vs.
McLane, supra.]
POINT II; AN ORDER ON A MODIFICATION PETITION SHOULD
LIKEWISE BE RES JUDICATA AS TO CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTING AT THE TIME
OF ITS ENTRY,
In the interest of encouraging finality and avoidance
of

endless

discussed

legal

proceedings,

the doctrine

of

res

judicata

in the preceding point should be applicable as to

circumstances existing at the time the court rules on a petition
for modification.
This would not preclude a party

from showing at a

subsequent hearing that there have been a sufficient number of
additional changes to tip the scales of equity, but when the
circumstances or factors relied upon are essentially the same, a
party should not be able to collaterally attack a prior ruling
from which no appeal was taken.
When these parties were before the court on September
10, 1986, the Appellant relied on precisely the same evidence,
with one exception, that he relied upon at the hearing on the
second petition for modification.
seven of Appellant's brief.
Sherril's

remarriage;

The items are listed at page

They are, in abbreviated form, (a)

(b) Sherril's

increase

in

income; (c)

17
Sherril's lease of the Glenwood home; (d) Bobbie's decrease in
income; (e) Majority of the oldest Henrie boy, Michael.
Giving Appellant the best of the disputed evidence 3 , a
comparison

of the circumstances

presented

at the time of the

first and second modification hearings are as follows:
Factor
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Sept. 10, 1986

May 27, 1987

Sherril's Marital statues.
remarried
Sherril's personal income.
$2,400
Sherrils lease of Glenwood home, leased
Bobbie's income.
$18,300 4

remarried
$2,728
leased
$17,333

(e) Majority of oldest Henrie child, minor
Viewing
Appellant

the

indicates

evidence
no

income of the parties.

in

a

appreciable

light
change

18 in Apr.
most
in

favorable

the

to

respective

The only new factor was the majority of

the oldest Henrie child who resides in the Dickinson home.

Not

only was his support a very temporary non-legal arrangement as
discussed,

supra

page

violates the maximum

12,

but

reliance

thereon

indirectly

that a change of circumstances cannot be

premised

on a fact that was

contemplated

within the original

decree.

fWoodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).]

[Lea

3

It is the Respondent, of course, who is entitled to this
treatment where it supports the decision of the lower court.
4

This is the figure given the court at the second
modification hearing.
In a dialogue with the Court during his
opening statement Bobbie's counsel stated that Bobbie's decrease
in income was from 18.3 thousand at the first modification
hearing the preceding fall to 17.3 thousand at the time of the
second hearing.
[T6,27MAY87]
The only evidence of Bobbie's
income in September of 1986 was an exhibit reflecting his W-2
earnings from the first seven and one-half months of that year.
The court was given no guidance beyond that, but assuming uniform
income to the end of the year, Bobbie's income would have been
$20,123 in 1986. (See page 8, supra.)

V,

Bowers,

658

P. 2d

Kessimakis. supra.]

1213

(Utah

1983)

and

Kessimakis

vs.

While support for the oldest Henrie child

was not governed by the Dickinson decree, the time table for his
becoming

an adult would

have been know at all times.

The

district court properly responded to a request for a finding that
the majority of the oldest Henrie child was an anticipated event.
THE COURT: You see, to me that gets to the
ridiculous point. You know when he is gonna
be 18 it terminates. I don't think I have to
find that. I don't think I have to find that
is was anticipated at the time I made the
decree. Of course it was anticipated . . . .
[T50-51,27MAY87]
The second

modification petition stands naked in light

of the court's decision denying relief on the first petition
based on the same evidence.
POINT III;
THE COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE
INCOME OF THE PARTIES ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Appellant's

counsel pressed

the court to find that

Bobbie's income had dropped from $25,000 down to $17,333.
court's response is as follows:
THE COURT:
I have not been convinced that
his income has been substantially modified.
And I say that because at the time of the
original trial his earnings by the W-2
Statement was approximately what it is now,
maybe a little less, and the other earnings
was cash payments from arrangements he had
with his employer, and at that time I felt
that those amounts that came out, came out
somewhat reluctantly and so I refuse to make
that finding. I just don't find there's been
a material change of circumstances based on
earning power.

The
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Before Appellant can attack this it is his duty to
"marshall all of the evidence" in support of the court's findings.

As the Supreme Court said in Ashton vs. Ashton, 73 3 P.2d

147, 150 (Utah 1987):
Only then can we consider whether
findings are "clearly erroneous".

[the]

The court went on to say:
Because defendant's have failed to make such
a showing, the trial courts findings will not
be disturbed" [Id.]
Appellant's

brief

fails

to

advise

the

court

that

Bobbie's evidence at trial did not fully disclose his income.
His exhibit one reflected a 1983 income of $19,322, a 1984 income
of $21,184, and a 1985 income of $16,984.
only

Of the 1984 income

$16,184 had been shown on his employer's records.

He

acknowledged that $5,000, paid in commissions, had not been shown
on his tax return.

[TR28]

On cross examination Bobbie further

acknowledged that he received $100 a week in cash which would not
have been shown on his W-2 income tax form. [TR51]

He further

admitted that he had not correctly reported his 1983 income.
[TR54,56]

Further, he acknowledged that he had told his wife,

Sherril, that their 1984 income was about $30,000.

[TR54]

He

explained that this included about $5,000 worth of insurance
premiums but otherwise did not explain the difference.

[TR55-56]

Similarly there were cash bonuses which he had received in 1985
not shown on his exhibit one.

[TR57]

Sherril disputed Bobbie's assertion that the $30,000
figure for 1984 included reference to insurance.

[TR90]

She
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further testified that she had examined the parties bank accounts
for the years '83, '84 and '85 and found that the d€>posits were
greater than Bobbie's description of income.

[Id.]

in 1983 when Bobbie showed $16,383 net income

For example,

(available for

deposit), there were bank deposits totaling $23,085.

[Id.]

Even

this would not have fully identified the income since Bobbie had
previously acknowledged that not all the bonuses were deposited
in the bank.

[TR57]

Another factor in this inquiry is Bobbie's testimony
that during the year 1986 he and his new wife, Gloria, had "net
disposable income" available for personal spending of $34,539.29,
[T49,13MAY87] even though their combined gross income for that
year was only $29,333.92.

[T53-56,27MAY87]

The difference was

not explained by their use of a credit card.
testified,

resulted

in

actual

expenditures

That use, Bobbie
of

$37,440.00.

[T50,13MAY87]
Given the normal downward variance between gross and
net income, it is unlikely that the child support received by
Dickinsons from Henries would have supplied the extra income
required to reach the $34,539 figure.

It is a full $8,000 more

net disposable income (including child support received) than was
available to the Henrie household even though their reported
gross incomes were comparable.

[see factual summary at page 13-

14 hereof.]
Under such circumstances it was not clearly erroneous
for the lower court to conclude that Bobbie had failed in his
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burden of proving a substantial diminution of earning capacity.
The increase in Sherril's income was unimpressive.

The

court found her income had increased from some $2,100 annually to
$2,728.

There was no evidence to the contrary.

With respect to

Sherril's lease of the Glenwood home for $260 per month, the
court found it did not augment her cash flow.

The outlay on the

first mortgage, taxes, insurance, and upkeep consumed the rental
payment.

[T56,27MAY87]

These

facts are undisputed

in the

record.
POINT IV: APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENT
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO WARRANT DISRUPTION OF THE ORIGINAL
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT,
A District Judge is entitled considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties and
his determinations are entitled to

a presumption of validity.

[Peterson vs. Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987); Hansen vs.
Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987).]5

Similarly, consider-

able deference is due the judgment of the trial court in determining whether to modify a divorce decree and that judgment is
not to be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates to
the contrary or unless the trial court has abused its discretion
or misapplied legal principles.
699 (Utah 1985).]

[Stettler vs. Stettler, 713 P. 2d

On appeal the burden is on the Appellant to

prove not only that the stated standard has been violated but
that it has resulted in substantial prejudicial error, or serious
5

As discussed, supra, the failure to appeal renders the
decree in these proceedings invulnerable to collateral attack.
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inequity manifesting a clear abuse of discretion.
Mitchell, 526 P.2d
reviewing
position

court

1359

must

(Utah 1974).]

give

due

of the trial judge,

[Mitchell vs.

Further, on appeal the

deference

to

the

advantageous

[Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P.2d

1218 (Utah 1980).] who, since the parties are usually before him,
can make a sounder appraisal of the situation.

[Sorensen vs.

Sorensen, 438 P.2d 180 (Utah 1968).] Finally, even though errors
may be made, unless those errors alter the outcome of the case,
they are viewed as harmless.

rciausen vs. Clausen, 675 P.2d 562

(Utah 1983) . ]
Appellant directs the court's attention to the case of
Chandler vs. West, 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980).

The precedent from

that case is sound and its application herein is not resisted.
The case holds that property settlements are not sacrosanct and
beyond the power of a court of equity to modify.
notwithstanding

the rule of law that property

This is so

settlements are

entitled to a greater sanctity than alimony and support payments
in modification proceedings.

[See Land vs. Land, 605 P. 2d 1248

(Utah 1980).]
Ultimately, the reviewing court must determine whether
the trial court has so violated principles of fairness and equity
that its decision cannot be allowed to stand, even in the face of
its presumed validity and the deference to which its author is
entitled.

If the conscience

of the reviewing

court

is truly

shocked by the lower court's refusal to modify a decree, then
such ruling ought not be permitted to stand.
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The
chapter.

Chandler

decision

does

not

contain

the

final

The Supreme Court addressed only the legal principle

and then remanded stating:
[T]his court is not in as an advantageous
position [as the lower court] to make a fair
determination as to which side has the
balance of the equities.11 [1301]
The case is more a strike against judicial rigidity
than it is a guide to what equity ultimately required.

The case

is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the Plaintiff in
Chandler had sold her home for $60,000 and the ultimate equitable
issue was whether a $13,000 mortgage should be paid from the sale
proceeds or by the defendant who had been making monthly payments.

No

information

is available as to what happened on

remand.
In the instant case the following factors seem relevant:
1.

The lower court wasn't satisfied that there had

been a substantial change in the earning power of the parties.
It is not difficult to understand how the court reached that
conclusion from the conflicting and less than candid evidence
Bobbie had given.
magnitude

alleged,

Even if there would have been a change of the
the

court

should

not upset

the property

settlement in light of the other factors present.
2.

Bobbie's obligations growing out of the marriage

had been reduced from $1,000 at the time of the decree ($300
alimony, $300 child support, $400 second mortgage payment) to
$518 at the time of the hearing on the second petition for
modification.
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3.

The $300 child

support paid by

Bobbie to the

Henrie household was more than offset by the $3 3 0 received in
return•

Up until shortly before the second modification hearing

the return support had been $495.

When the child support is

considered, Bobbie's net outflow at the time of the hearing on
the second petition was limited to $188 and shortly before had
only been $23.
4.

While secured by a pledge of the Glenwood home,

the second mortgage arose

from the consolidation

of

several

family debts including a debt on Bobbie's truck that is now free
and clear [T31;T36,10SEPT.86;T49,13MAY87].
5.

Sherril's

($2,728 annually).

income

continues

to

be

very

modest

Whether Bobbie's income remains at $25,000 or

has decreased to $17,333, as alleged, the disparity is still
overwhelming.
6.

If the income of spouses are considered, then, at

the least, the Dickinson household has an annual income comparable to the Henrie household, and given what Bobbie testified was
the Dickinson's

"net disposable

income", the Dickinsons have

substantially more money to actually spend.
7.

Finally, Respondent

considerable equitable importance.

urges

one

other

factor of

Parties to divorce litigation

should be able to rely on the finality of property settlements
unless

the

change

of

circumstances

is

truly

substantial.

Property settlements, which the court found this one clearly was,
[T55,27MAY87] though not sacrosanct, ought not be subject to

25
disruption whenever one of the parties has a shift in their
annual income•

That is especially true where, as here, Bobbie's

regular income has, even by his own testimony, remained uniform
and where bonuses come from special jobs which cannot be predicted with reliability.

If the court is obliged to react to

what may well be temporary income shifts, the parties may "whipsaw" each other every time the financial climate changes.

If,

for example, Bobbie were relieved of the obligation to make the
$218 second mortgage payment, should he be hauled back into court
on a petition to reinstate this obligation when he receives his
commission on the Red Hills Middle School job which he indicated
would be paid in the future?

[TR58-59,27MAY87]

What if he

receives the ownership interest in the business which would now
be imminent?

[TR88; page 7 supra]

If Sherril completes her

schooling and obtains a teaching certificate, must she do so at
the peril of being dragged back into court to relitigate the
property division?
The undersigned respectfully submits that there isn't
anything in this case which has happened or which can now be
reasonably contemplated which would warrant the court's revisiting and upsetting the property settlement.
POINT V. THIS A PROPER CASE FOR AWARDING RESPONDENT
HER COSTS AND A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE.
Rule 33(a) (Utah Ct. App.) authorizes an award of costs
and attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the appeal is
determined to be either frivolous or brought for delay.
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This court recently had occasion to deal with this rule
in the case of Eames vs. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987)•
While Respondent does not impugn the good faith of
Appellant's counsel, she respectfully, submits that the record
establishes a contemptuous attitude on the part of the Appellant
toward the orders of the lower court and a total lack of any
sense of obligation to his wife of 14 years.

His attitude toward

the court is evidenced by the adjudication of contempt on May 13,
1987.

His attitude toward giving any assistance to the wife who

helped him through college and cared for his home and family was
amply reflected

in the testimony cited on pages 5-6 of this

brief.
A similar attitude led this court in the Eames case to
question the sincerity of the appeal and the position advanced by
the Appellant.
Surely a wife of 30 years deserves something
more than being cast adrift in the sea of
economic uncertainly without some long-term
support from a husband with superior earning
potential. [Id. at 398]
It

perhaps

goes without

saying

that

the

extensive

litigation herein, including particularly this appeal., has been
extremely costly and disquieting to the Respondent.

Surely the

Appellant can see that this matter should have been put to rest
before, and that there has not been a clear shifting of the
equities such as to warrant the court unwinding the property
settlement

established

appeal was taken.

in the original

decree

from which no
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Appellant's collateral attack on the original decree as
well as his collateral

attack on the denial

from the first

modification petition, raises a reasonable and almost inescapable
inference of bad faith.

[see Cady vs. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149

(Utah 1983)]

S U M M A R Y

AND

C O N C L U S I O N

Appellant has failed to meet the burden of establishing
a material change of circumstances warranting a modification of
the property settlement contained in the divorce decree.

The

judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Further, it seems appropriate for the court to evoke
the power it has under Rule 33(a) and to award Respondent costs
and attorney's fees and to remand the matter to the district
court for a determination of those costs and attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ J L ^ ^ &&Y of June, A.D.
1988.
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Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Supplemental authority case number 870334-CA,
Bobbie C. Dickinson vs. Sherril Cottrell Dickinson.

Dear Sir:
Pursuant to rule 24(j), the Respondent directs the Court's
attention to the recent decision in Porco vs. Porco, 752 P2.d 365
(Utah Appellate, 1988).
The decision in the Porco case is relevant to points I, II,
IV and V at pages 15, 16, 21 and 25, respectively, of respondent's brief.
It is respectfully requested that this supplemental authority be brought to the attention of the panel assigned the abovereferenced appeal.
Pursuant to the Court's rule, five copies
hereof are enclosed. Further, be advised that a copy has been
furnished to opposing counsel.
Sincerely,
1

^

^

Kay L. McIff
KLM/sc
cc: Marcus Taylor, Attorney
for Plaintiff-Appellant

^
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the light most favorable to the court below,
the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corporation,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah
Ct.App.1987). Appellant has wholly failed
to sustain this burden. Moreover, the
record contains ample evidence from which
the trial court could conclude that Borrego
intended to disrupt the proceedings.
[2] Borrego's second contention is that
the court was required to warn him that his
conduct was contumacious before a finding
of contempt could be made. While admitting that the court indicated that it found
profanity in the courtroom extremely offensive, defendant asserts that the statement was not an effective warning because
it was "made to Mr. Borrego's attorney
and not to Mr. Borrego directly, and no
direction was given to counsel to warn Mr.
Borrego." The assertion is clearly without
merit The record of proceedings is sufficient to establish that Borrego was made
aware that his conduct was inappropriate
and that he was represented by competent
counsel who was aware of proper courtroom conduct. Finally, Borrego's reliance
on Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94
S.Ct 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974) is misplaced. Eaton was a per curiam decision
holding that a trial judge's finding of contempt based solely on the use of an expletive in response to cross-examination could
not be affirmed. The decision specifically
noted that the expletive was not directed
toward the court and that there was no
indication in the record of loud or boisterous conduct or any attempt to prevent the
court from carrying on its duties. The
factual situation is markedly different from
that presented by the transcript of proceedings in the present case.
[3] Borrego further contends that the
findings are insufficient in that they do not
detail how the sentencing "was delayed or
unduly interrupted" by his comments.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 (1987) requires
the court to recite the facts as occurring
"in [the court's] immediate view and presence" that support the judgment of con*~~*^+ Tk<> /»ruiv-t in this case found, in

relevant part, that defendant "became loud
and boisterous, using profanity which tended to interrupt the due course of the sentencing hearing." In reviewing a challenge
to a trial court's factual findings, we apply
a "clearly erroneous" standard. That standard requires that "if the findings . . . are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made, the findings . . . will be set
aside." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1987). We conclude that the findings
of the trial court are supported by the
weight of the evidence and that they adequately support the judgment of the court.
The judgment of contempt is affirmed.
GARFF, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.,
concur.

(O

| KEY NUMMI SYSTEM>

Guido C. PORCO, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
•.

Vincenza Mangio PORCO, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860150-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 5, 1988.
Former husband brought motion seeking to terminate alimony, to secure return
of certain personal property and to recover
attorney fees. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, John A. Rokich, J., denied motion and ordered former husband to
pay former wife's attorney fees, and former husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1) finding that
there had been no material change in parties' circumstances, as required to modify
divorce decree, was amply supported by the
record; (2) absent showing of substantive
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change in circumstances concerning distribution of property, divorce decree could not
be modified; (3) trial court's award of attorney fees was not in abuse of discretion;
and (4) former wife was entitled to costs
and attorney fees on appeal.
Affirmed and remanded.

1. Divorce <s=*164
Having failed to appeal original divorce decree, former husband, in order to
modify decree, had to show substantial
change of circumstances occurring since
entry of decree and not contemplated in
decree itself.
2. Divorce <S=*245(3)
Finding that there had been no material change in parties' circumstances, as required to modify divorce decree, was amply
supported by the record, which showed
that former wife still required $200 alimony award to maintain as nearly as possible
her previous standard of living and to prevent her from becoming a public charge.
3. Divorce <3=>254(2), 255
Absent showing of substantive change
in circumstances concerning distribution of
property, divorce decree could not be modified and matters previously litigated and
incorporated therein could not be collaterally attacked in face of doctrine of res judicata.
4. Divorce <3=>254(2)
Trial court's alleged failure to award
husband other property in wife's possession, which he originally purchased, was
not a changed circumstance as would support modification of divorce decree.
5. Divorce <S=»254(1)
Radial arm saw was not a "hand tool"
under terms of divorce decree.
6. Divorce <s=*227(l)
In divorce action, award of attorney
fees must be supported by the evidence
that amount awarded was reasonable and
that party receiving award was reasonably
in need.

7. Divorce <&=»227(1)
Factors of reasonableness of attorn**
fees in divorce actions include necessity^
number of hours dedicated, reasonableness
of rate charged in light of difficulty of cast
and result accomplished, and rates con**
monly charged for divorce actions in the
community.
8. Divorce <fc*224
Pleadings, discovery, former husband's
obstreperous behavior, time devoted to pretrial matters and actual trial time reflected
apparent reasonableness of former wife's
request for attorney fees in divorce action.
9. Divorce <s=>226
Evidence of former wife's need for assistance in paying her attorney fees unfolded during entire trial, so special proceeding
specifically concerned with determining her
need was not necessary.
10. Costs «=>260(5)
Former husband's frivolous appeal and
his apparent harassment of former wife
through repeated civil actions against her
warranted award of costs and attorney
fees on appeal. Court of Appeals Rule
33(a).
11. Costs «=>26(KD
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should
only be applied in egregious cases, lest
there be improper chilling of right to appeal erroneous trial court decisions, but
sanctions should be imposed when appeal is
obviously without any merit and has been
taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing and results in delayed implementation of judgment of lower court, increased
costs of litigation and dissipation of time
and resources. Court of Appeals Rules
33(a), 40(a).
Joseph H. Gallegos, Michael R. Sciumbato, Gallegos & Sciumbato, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellant
John Spencer Snow, Snow & Halliday,
Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent
Before GARFF, JACKSON and
ORME, JJ.
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OPINION

592, 594 (Utah 1983). The trial court found
there
was no material change of circumGARFF, Judge:
stances. To overturn this finding, plaintiff
Plaintiff/appellant Guido and defendmust show that the evidence clearly preant/respondent Vincenza Porco were diponderates to the contrary, or that the trial
vorced on July 14, 1977, after a twenty-sevcourt abused its discretion or misapplied
en year marriage. The trial court ordered
the law, or that the trial court's award
plaintiff to pay defendant $200 alimony per
works such a manifest injustice as to show
month and distributed the parties' properclearly an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill,
ty.
718 P.2d 779, 780 (Utah 1986). However,
Plaintiff has unsuccessfully attempted to the trial court is afforded considerable disterminate or modify alimony payments cretion, and its actions are cloaked with a
four times between January 1980 and the presumption of validity. Id; see also
filing of this action on February 29, 1984. *
King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-16 (Utah
He has previously refused to pay alimony,
1986); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670
which has resulted in several judgments
(Utah Ct.App.1987).
and garnishment proceedings being taken
against him. By his present motion, he
seeks to terminate ahmony, to secure the
I
return of certain personal property, and to
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
recover attorney fees. Defendant filed a
[2] The record amply supports the trial
motion in response to plaintiffs motion
seeking alimony arrearages, attorney fees, court's finding that there has been no maand an order restraining plaintiff from ha- terial change in the parties* circumstances.
rassing her by continually bringing modifi- Although plaintiffs and defendant's incation actions.
comes have increased, their expenses have
On July 31, 1985, the trial court denied also increased proportionately, resulting in
plaintiffs motion and ordered him to pay no substantial change in their relative fidefendant's attorney fees. Plaintiff con- nancial positions. Defendant still requires
tends that the trial court abused its discre- the $200 alimony award to maintain as
tion by (1) finding no material change of nearly as possible her previous standard of
circumstances and, thereby, refusing to living and to prevent her from becoming a
terminate alimony; (2) failing to award public charge. See English v. English, 565
plaintiff certain items of personal property; P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). We affirm the
and (3) awarding $1,500 in attorney fees to trial court on this issue.
defendant
[1] Plaintiff did not appeal the original
divorce decree. To modify the decree now,
p)amtilf must show "a substantia) change
of circumstances occurring since the entry
of the decree and not contemplated in the
decree itself." Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d
707, 710 (Utah 1985). See also Jeppson v.
Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984);
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d
1. Plaintiff instituted modification actions in
January 1980, May 1980, October 1981, and
June 1982.
2. The original divorce decree was entered on
July 14, 1977.
3. Plaintiff was originally awarded two vehicles,
a camper, several guns, various hand tools and

II
PERSONAL PROPERTY
[3] Ten years after entry of the original
divorce decree,2 plaintiff requests that this
Court redistribute certain items of personal
property.3 Plaintiff has failed to show any
substantive change of circumstance concerning the distribution of property and
"persona! possessions and affects [sic] as his
sole and separate property now in his possession." Defendant was awarded "all of the furnishings and effects, including the fixtures and
appliances and other personal property in the
home of the parties not awarded to the plain-*
tiff."
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"[i]n the absence of such a showing, the
decree shall not be modified and the matters previously litigated and incorporated
therein cannot be collaterally attacked in
face of the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, [the] attempt to challenge the equity of the original decree cannot be tolerated." Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580
P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) (footnote omitted). See also Foulger v. Foulger, 626
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981).
[4] Plaintiff further alleges that the trial court's failure to award him other personal property in defendant's possession,
which he originally purchased, has resulted
in a serious inequity requiring reversal of
the original property distribution. However, this is not a changed circumstance, so
any inequity should have been resolved at
the original trial or by appeal of that decision.
[5] Plaintiff also seeks to have defendant held in contempt of court for failing to
return to him a radial arm saw. He speciously argues that it can be operated with
one hand, and, therefore, under the terms
of the original decree, is his property as a
"hand tool." Obviously, a radial arm saw
is not a hand tool. This argument merely
epitomizes the frivolous nature of this appeal, and warrants no further comment
We thus affirm the trial court's refusal to
redistribute the personal property.
Ill
ATTORNEY FEES
16,7] Plaintiff contends that attorney
fees should not have been awarded to defendant because there was insufficient evidence of defendant's need. In divorce actions, an award of attorney fees must be
supported by evidence that the amount
awarded was reasonable and that the party
receiving the award was reasonably in
need. Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419
(Utah 1986). "Relevant factors of reasonableness include 'the necessity of the num4. In any case, the award might be sustainable
on an alternate ground, pursuant to Utah Code

ber of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty
of the case and the result accomplished,
and the rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community.' " Beals v.*
Beats, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984) (quot
ing Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85
(Utah 1980)); see also Talley v. Talley, 739
P.2d 83, 84 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
[8] Defendant's attorney submitted a
well-documented
affidavit
requesting
$4,130.70. By comparison, the trial court's
award of $1,500 was minimal. No cross-appeal concerning the attorney fee award
was filed by defendant, and we, accordingly, have no occasion to consider whether
error was committed in awarding this reduced amount The pleadings, discovery,
plaintiff's obstreperous behavior, time devoted to pre-trial matters, and actual trial
time all reflect the apparent reasonableness of defendant's request, much less the
amount actually awarded.
[9] Evidence of defendant's need for assistance in paying her attorney fees unfolded during the entire trial, so a special proceeding specifically concerned with determination of her need is not necessary. The
Utah Supreme Court similarly concluded in
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,
1279 (Utah 1987), stating: "Because ample
evidence of [the wife's] financial condition
was before the court, we reject [the husband's] argument that the trial court's finding of need was unsupported by the evidence."
Because the trial court's award was
based on evidence that the amount awarded was reasonable and defendant was in
need, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to defendant 4
IV
SANCTIONS FOR
FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
In oral argument, defendant's counsel
argued for the imposition of sanctions on
plaintiff for bringing a frivolous appeal.
determines that the action or defense to the
action was without merit and not brought or
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[10] This Court is distressed both by
the frivolous nature of this appeal and by
plaintiffs apparent harassment of defendant through repeatedly bringing civil actions against her and, thereby, forcing her
to pay substantial court costs and attorney
fees. Rule 33(a) of the Rules of Utah
Court of Appeals provides that "[i]f the
court determines that a motion made or an
appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party."
We find no legal or factual basis for this
appeal in the record. Instead, it is merely
a continuation of plaintiffs efforts to harass defendant. This Court has previously
defined a frivolous appeal as "one having
no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a)."5 O'Brien t>. Rush,
744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah CtApp.1987); see
also Barber v. The Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202, 203 (Ct.App. 1988).
[11] We recognize that sanctions for
frivolous appeals should only be applied in
egregious cases, lest there be an improper
chilling of the right to appeal erroneous
lower court decisions. However, sanctions
should be imposed when "an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation
of the judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation
of the time and resources of the Law
Court" Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day,
438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me.1981). Therefore,
we award costs and attorney fees on appeal
to defendant
At some point, plaintiff should understand that his emotional involvement in this
case completely distorts the factual merits
5. Rule 40(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals states, in pertinent part, that:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or the
party has read the motion, brief, or other
paper; that to the best of the attorney's or the
party's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;

of his arguments, That message has previously been delivered five different times by
the trial court. We wish to make it clear to
plaintiff, by imposing this sanction, that
any further efforts on his part to punish
defendant will only result in his increased
expenditure of time, effort and money.
We affirm the trial court's decision and
remand this matter to the trial court for
determination of the full amount of costs
and attorney fees, without reduction, reasonably incurred by defendant on appeal.4
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Anita Cuba WALKER aka Anita Cuba
Lofgreen aka Kelly Walker,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 870434-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 7, 1988.
Defendant moved to reinstate criminal
appeal from judgment of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno,
J. The Court of Appeals held that although defense counsel took no actions beyond preliminary steps for initiating appeal, appeal would be reinstated since refusal to reinstate might result in denial of
and that it is not interposed for any improper
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation.
6. The trial court is authorized to allocate responsibility for payment of defendant's costs
and fees on appeal, in whole or in part, to
plaintiff or to plaintiffs attorney as it deems
appropriate.

